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''Black, White and Grey''
Warti111e Argu111ents for and against
the Strategic Bo111ber Offensive
David Ian Hall
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©Canadian Military History, Volume 7, Number l, Winter 1998, pp.7-l9.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1998

7

1

Canadian Military History, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 2

events for those who know little about them. The
CBC. for example. sent a researcher to the RAF
Air Historical Branch in London only after public
criticism in Canada forced an investigation into
the McKenna's programme Death by Moonlight. 5
More worrisome still are the results of a poll
commissioned by The Sunday Times in April
1993. The newspaper revealed that 56 per cent
of British children between 11 and 16 years of
age obtained their knowledge of the Second
World War from television. 6 If such a study were
conducted in Canada the percentage would be
considerably higher; the Second World War is
not taught in Canadian schools and very few
universities offer courses in Canadian military
history. This might lead one to argue that
television producers, among others, have a great
responsibility to ensure that their educational
programming is both accurate and objective.
This essay, therefore, aims to redress the
balance in this hotly contested debate by
examining some of the wartime arguments both
for and against the bomber offensive, in
particular, it highlights the contrasting views of
two men who served at Bomber Command
Headquarters during the height of the campaign,
Wing Commander T.D. (Harry) Weldon and RAF
Chaplain L. John Collins. 7 The analysis itself
inevitably concentrates upon the interpretation
of the laws and strategic factors which governed
the use of air forces in the Second World War,
the course and development of the strategic air
campaign, and the ethical position taken toward
it by the Church of England.
The history of the bomber offensive is
extremely complex. If the documentary evidence
condemning it, and those responsible for it, was
that clear and irrefutable, historians would not
still be debating the subject as fiercely as they
do. The Anglo-American bomber campaign did
not take place in a moral void or an ethical
wasteland as some ofits most recent critics have
suggested. A lively debate on its merits and
morality took place both before and during the
war. In fact, almost all of the principal arguments
for and against mass aerial bombardment were
set out well before the war began.
Writing to the Archbishop of Canterbury,
Cosmo Gordon Lang, in May 1939, Father
Stephen Bedale, Warden ofKelham Theological
College, called on the Church to speak out

against the "killing of helpless civilians by terror
bombings."8 He wanted the Archbishop, as head
of the official church ofthe state, to demand from
the government a definite disavowal of any
intention to resort to methods of terrorism in
the likelihood of war. Be dale was not pro-Nazi.
insincere or unpatriotic, or even a naive pacifist
who objected to war in any shape or form. Rather,
his objections were some of the more lucid ones
to come out of a small but increasingly vocal
protest movement in Britain against aerial
bombardment.
Bedale regretted the fact that the Church had
been unable to forbid all resort to war, but he
was not against Christian men bearing arms to
resist or remedy injustice. Citing the teachings
of both St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Augustine
he re-confirmed, unequivocally, that "to the state
the temporal Sword has been committed by God
for the maintenance of natural justice. and in
the last resort that Sword must be used. "9 This
right, however, as interpreted by Bedale, did not
extend to the indiscriminate slaughter of
noncombatant (or more precisely, the wounded,
women and children). Consequently, he believed
that the Church had a moral responsibility to
more or less insist that the use of force be limited,
and that considerations of natural compassion
and common humanity be maintained when the
force of arms was employed. Any resort to
strategic bombing, claimed Bedale, would be
tantamount to adopting a policy of terrorism that
deliberately ignored these limits.
The delicate and potentially far-reaching
matter of the church participating in a public
censuring of government policy was taken up by
the Archbishop's personal chaplain, Reverend
Alan C. Don, Dean of Westminster. Don
proceeded cautiously, writing to Sir Kingsley
Wood, the Secretary of State for Air, for
clarification of the government's position on
waging air warfare. Kingsley Wood appreciated
the extent to which the subject of air
bombardment and the fate of non-combatants
worried the British public, both with regard to
actual events over the last few years, namely in
Spain and China, and their own more personal
apprehensions about the future. He was,
therefore, happy to oblige Lambeth Palace with
a thorough and refreshingly honest reply.
Kingsley Wood described the three basic
principles that governed Britain's approach to
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The primary aircraft of RAF
Bomber Command Right: A Handley Page Halifax

of 405 Squadron RCAF.
(CFPU UK 1981)

Below: An Avro Lancaster
going about its job over an
enemy port.
(CFPU PL 144407)

aerial warfare. First, the intentional
bombardment of a civilian population was
forbidden. Second, air forces were to attack
military targets only, and third, airmen were to
take reasonable care to avoid bombing any
adjacent concentrations of civilians. 10
These principles were, in fact, already part
of the public record. The Prime Minister, Neville
Chamberlain, promulgated them in the House
of Commons on 21 June 1938, and from that
date they governed the policy by which the RAF
went to war in 1939. 1 1 Both satisfied and grateful
to Kingsley Wood for setting the record straight,
the Archbishop of Canterbury saw no need for
the Church to become involved in telling the
government how, or how not, to wage war. So
long as the rules of war were observed the
Church would (and did) stand by the
government. 12
Unfortunately it was with "the rules" that the
controversy over strategic bombing began. Prior
to the Second World War and its course of events,
internationally agreed rules governing air warfare
did not exist. ~:3 The 1923 Hague Draft Rules of
Aerial Warfare was the first authoritative attempt
to clarify and formulate a comprehensive code
of conduct, but they were never adopted in legally
binding terms. 14 Growing awareness of the
military potential of aircraft throughout the
1920s and 1930s ultimately proved too serious
an obstacle to reaching an agreement.
One of the main stumbling blocks was the
inability to establish an acceptable definition of

a legitimate military target under the new
conditions of total war between industrialised
states. Air Marshal Sir Robert Saundby summed
up this conundrum nicely when he wrote:
It is generally agreed, for example, that the man
who loads or fires a field-gun is a military target.
So is the gun itself, and the ammunition dump
which supplies it. So is the truck-driver who
transports ammunition from the base to the
dump. So- in the last two World Wars- was the
man who transported weapons, ammunition,
raw materials, etc., by sea. But are the weapons
and war-like stores on their way from the
factories to the bases, and the men who transport
them, not also military targets? And what about
weapons under construction in the factories, and
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the men who make them? Are they not also
military targets? And if they are not, where do
you draw the line? If they are military targets,
are not the industrial areas and the services-gas, electricity-- that keep industry going, also
military targets? Or is it permissible to starve
these civilian workers by blockade, or shell them
if you can get at them, but not to bomb them
from the air? This is surely a 'reductio ad
absurdum.' 15

Factories making armaments and the
transport bringing them to the battlefronts
naturally were included in the category of
legitimate targets once the means of attacking
them were available. Consequently those
civilians in them or dangerously close to them
might just have to be equated with civilians in
legitimately attacked places. Moreover, precedent
was on the side of the air planners. Naval
bombardment of ports and towns was an
accepted act of war. It was even codified in Article
2 of the Convention on Naval Bombardment,
signed at The Hague in 1907. Article 2 stipulated
that a naval commander who used his ships'
guns to destroy military objectives in an
undefended port or town "incur[red] no
responsibility for any unavoidable damage which
may be caused by a bombardment under such
circumstances.''IG The advent of air power merely
increased the opportunity of reaching and
destroying such targets.
International law did not protect civilians
from bombardment from the sea, the ground,
or the air. Even so, indiscriminate bombing of
the civilian population was not widely embraced
as a principal object for attack by air forces. By
the early 1930s the Royal Air Force had already
rejected indiscriminate bombing as a possible
"short cut" to victory. Moral objections to the
bombing of thickly populated areas without
warning, did influence official policy, 17 but of
greater importance was the Air Staffs own
appraisal that bombing civilians, as a primary
target of war, was uneconomical. Their
preference was to employ Britain's small bomber
force, with maximum emphasis on accurate
bombing, against objectives most likely to
damage the enemy's war effort. Two targets
singled out for such air attack were war-related
industry and rail transportation. 18
On 2 September 1939, on the very eve of
Britain and France's entry into the second major

European war this century, the two governments
declared that only "strictly military objectives in
the narrowest sense of the word" would be
bombed by their respective air forces. The Allies
made this declaration in part because they were
anxious to avoid a strategic bombing exchange
with Germany's superior Luftwaffe. a contest
they believed they would lose. Unexpectedly, and
somewhat surprisingly, the German government
pledged similar restraint, although the course
of events quickly demonstrated its hollow ring.
Mass air attacks by the Luftwaffe on Warsaw.
between 20-25 September, inflicted heavy
casualties on the civilian population. 19 The die
had been cast. Speaking to a large audience in
Manchester, Winston Churchill, the soon-to-be
British Prime Minister and war leader,
condemned German military decisions made
without thought to humanitarian concerns. "We
know from what they did in Poland," Churchill
told his anxious listeners, "that there is no
brutality or bestial massacre of civilians by air
bombing which they would not readily commit
if they thought it was for their advantage." 2 o
Ruthlessness is unpleasant to say the least,
but it is not necessarily illegal. In other words,
one can be both ruthless and operate within the
law. Indeed, there is a powerful argument that
the Germans were operating within the existing
tolerances, as they were, for air attacks on city
centres and civilians. 21
Churchill's assessment that questions of
ethical or humanitarian concerns had no place
in the German style of aggressive warfare was
accurate, although it was based more on
emotional sentiment than on any accepted legal
definition. Nonetheless, if the indiscriminate
bombing of Warsaw was not enough to validate
his message to the British people, the Luftwaffe's
concentrated attack on Rotterdam on 13 May
1940 removed any remaining doubts concerning
German intentions and practice. Without regard
to civilian casualties, the Luftwaffe was used to
break the last enemy resistance. The southern
part of the city was transformed into rubble.
According to notes left by General von Waldau,
chief of the Luftwaffe command staff responsible
for planning the attack, "this radical method was
the only one possible." His chilling conclusion,
noting that, "The complete surrender of Holland
followed only two hours later, "22 reflected the only
justification the Germans required for the action
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taken. For the first time in history, strategic air
forces were the decisive influence in bringing
about an end to a military campaign.

object of attack, but the days had long since past
when moral objections protected them even from
indirect bombardment. 26

Meanwhile, in Britain, pressure continued
to mount for retaliatory strikes against German
cities and towns. 23 Leading letters in many
British newspapers regularly asked why the air
force was not being used against Germany. Up
until May 1940, RAF raids were confined to
attacks on German naval units at sea, or at
anchor, and no serious attempts were made to
drop bombs on the German mainland. The
Luftwaffe's ruthless bombing of Rotterdam, and
Germany's inexorable land offensive against
France precipitated a change in the RAF's policy
of restraint. On 15 May the War Cabinet gave
Bomber Command permission to bomb the
Ruhr. Initial targets included oil refineries and
the railway network, two target systems that were
to feature prominently throughout the remaining
years of the war. Bomber crews were given
specific aiming points, and they were instructed
to return home to their bases with their bombs,
if they could not locate the target, rather than
drop them indiscriminately on innocent civilians.
Even during the midst of the Luftwaffe's night
blitz on British cities, when the Cabinet
considered switching some of the weight of the
RAF"s counterattack over to German civilians,
the Air Staff argued that "nothing would be
gained by promiscuous bombing. "24 Only when
it was realised that the bombers lacked the
technical sophistication necessary to hit precise
targets did entire industrial cities become their
objective. 25

Area bombing was the main policy for 1942,
and it more or less remained as such until the
spring of 1945.27 It was around the same time
that the RAF adopted an area bombing strategy
that the Reverend John Collins was posted to
RAF Station Yatesbury in Wiltshire. Collins
joined the RAF Volunteer Reserve (RAFVR) as
an Anglican Chaplain in 1940. Before that he
had enjoyed a distinguished career, both in
academia and the Church. 28 His posting to
Yatesbury marked the start of what was to
become a deep personal transformation that
would have a profound influence on the rest of
his life, including that of founding the British
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament. 29

On 14 February 1942, a new Directive
marked a substantial change in British air policy.
Bomber Command was instructed to shift the
primary emphasis of its attacks on to specific
"industrial areas." Essen, the heart of the Ruhr's
industrial complex, with its heavy industry
including the Krupps armament works, was
singled out as the most important target for
attack. The stated as well as intended aim of the
new policy was the progressive destruction and
dislocation of the German military and economic
system. A corollary objective was the
undermining of the morale of the German people,
and in particular, that of the industrial workers,
to a point where their capacity for resistance was
fatally weakened. Civilians per se were not the

RAF Yates bury in 1940 was a large bustling
training centre for air gunners and wireless
operators as well as wireless and radar operators
in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF). There
were in excess of five Air Wings training on the
station throughout most of the war. The camp
had its own sports facilities, hospital, cinema
and theatre. It also had six resident chaplains of
various denominations, 30 each with their own
chapels. Church attendance was not high but
the chaplains were kept very busy caring for
those who found the demands of their course
and the war too stressful. Collins lent an
additional hand at the hospital when he was not
overburdened with normal counselling duties.:11
After a few months at Yatesbury, Collins
noted with distress that many of the young men
and women passing through the camp had
actively turned away from the Church of England.
He put it down to dislocation and deprivation,
not to mention the horror and revulsion, brought
on by the recent war. A similar decline in faith
had occurred towards the end, and during the
years immediately after, the Great War 19141918. Nevertheless it was a worrying trend that
Collins aimed to reverse. Beginning in the spring
of 1942 he inaugurated a series of Tuesday
evening discussions that were designed to
enhance Christian fellowship on the station. By
July a formal membership had developed and
"The Fellowship of the Transfiguration of Our
Lord" was born. 32

ll

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 1998

5

Canadian Military History, Vol. 7 [1998], Iss. 1, Art. 2

The bomb bay of a Lancaster X prior to a raid on
the Ruhr. The relatively short distance to the target
allowed a full load of bombs to be carried- 20 x 500
lb high explosive. general purpose bombs for a total
of 10.000 lbs.
(CFPU PL 40683)

The first members of the Fellowship came
from the staff and the discharged patients of the
camp hospital, where Collins, through his
volunteer work, had developed a considerable
reputation as a devout Christian and a
compassionate man. Throughout the year the
membership widened and grew. ~14 "Padre John,"
as he was affectionately known at Yatesbury, had
found a willing audience. The "Tuesday talks"
retained their place of predominance, with
Collins speaking on aspects of Christianity.
international brotherhood, the war, and, amongst
other things, the RAF's bombing policy. Collins
was not against the war for he honestly believed
that Hitler and the Nazis were an evil force that
had to be overthrown if God's peace on earth
was to be achieved. What disturbed Collins, and
what he believed was unacceptable, was the
spiralling escalation of indiscriminate violence
and wanton destruction (which he perceived as
being peculiar to this ghastly war) and was
epitomised in part by the aerial bombardment
of cities and towns. 35
Members of this new Christian society
pledged themselves to the service of God and
their fellow human beings. A short list of rules
entitled "The Fellowship Rules of Life" was drawn
up to guide them in their efforts. Personal
responsibilities included making a strong
commitment to Christian practices, regular
church attendance, taking Holy Communion,
daily prayers. and bible reading. Collins, as
founder, president and spiritual leader,
encouraged an active, aggressive Christianity. He
wanted the Fellowship to be a public display of
faith in defiance of the terrible times in which
they lived, and in the face of religious scepticism.
The Fellowship's main objective, as set out in
rule number nine, was "To try to make the social,
economic and political implications of the gospel
effective in local and national affairs." Collins
believed this was possible through individual
choice and public example. 33

Collins, like Bedale before him in 1939, and
a number of other English clerics~' during the
war, objected to the proportionate increase in
violence and destruction aerial bombardment
brought to the waging of war. Moreover, they
lamented its propensity to kill large numbers of
civilians. For them, strategic bombing was an
immoral act of war because of the crude and
inaccurate techniques inherent in its method.
Unlike Shakespeare's tragic character Macbeth,
who confessed grimly, "I have supped full with
horrors: Direness, familiar to my slaughterous
thoughts, Cannot once start me. "~' Collins and
other like-minded critics rejected the natural
consequences of war. In particular, they denied
the physical reality of war when waged with the
most recent weapons produced by modern
technology. It was as if they were saying war could
become more decent and more tolerable once
bombing was banned.
6
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Few would argue that the objections to area
bombing raised by Collins and his supporters
were not heartfelt and sincere, even though many
of those making them were better known for their
unctuousness than lucid argument. 38
Collectively, they also betrayed a naive
understanding of the dialectic between morality
and war. After all, it is not so much a case of this
or that means of waging war that is immoral or
inhumane. War itself is immoral. Once full-scale
war has broken out the means for limiting its
barbarities, excesses and horrors are virtually
non-existent. The moral question then is whether
or not it is imperative to fight the war at all? If
the answer is yes, then the proper course, indeed
the moral obligation implicitly undertaken by
going to war, is to win as quickly and as cheaply
as possible. A degree of restraint may be selfimposed by the potential victor's desire to win a
decent peace, but for the nation facing defeat,
similar concern for the future may not apply. 39
Legal and moral principles against which the
supposed "acceptable" strategies of war are
tested, are themselves tested against reality. They
are not an absolute. In the British case, the RAF
went out of its way to avoid bombing civilians in
the early stages of the war. After nearly three
years of at best disappointing results, the Air
Staff accepted the fact that they could not
prosecute the war successfully with their existing
technology so long as the self-imposed
restrictions designed to limit collateral damage
were maintained. Their bombing policy,
therefore, was adjusted to fit the conditions and
the circumstances deemed necessary to win the
war. The efficacy of the area bombing policy, as
practised from 1942 to 1945, is yet another
fiercely disputed and equally contentious
subject. 40 But with regard to its morality, it really
becomes a question of how many of one's own
people is one prepared to sacrifice on the altar
of ethics?
Most of Britain's churchmen supported the
bomber offensive in its various stages of
development throughout the war. "Often in life
there is no clear choice between absolute right
and wrong; frequently the choice had to be made
of the lesser of two evils," wrote Dr. Cyril Garbett,
the Archbishop of York, "and it is a lesser evil to
bomb a war-loving Germany than to sacrifice the
lives of thousands of our own fellow-

countrymen ... and to delay delivering millions
now held in slavery." Having established his point
of principle, Garbett went one step further and
presented a compelling argument in favour of
the Allies using their air superiority to bring the
war to a swift and successful conclusion. His
views were published in The Times on 25 June
1943, with the unequivocal approval of Lambeth
Palace.
William Temple, the Archbishop of
Canterbury, just like Cosmo Lang before him,
said much the same as Garbett about the bomber
offensive. Reluctantly, yet with unwavering
conviction, the Archbishop accepted it as a
necessary evil in a far from perfect human world.
One of the many letters Temple wrote in reply to
critics, who assailed him for not demanding an
immediate end to the bombing of large cities, is
worth quoting in detail, In December 1942, he
responded in fairly typical fashion to a letter from
Ashley Sampson, the representative of a group
of eminent Christian clergy and laity, including
C.S. Lewis, who were publishing a "Manifesto"
against bombing:
What your Manifesto really requires is that we
should not attempt to destroy munitions factories
which supply the enemy or the power stations
and the like which enable those factories to work.
Attack upon such objectives from the air must
involve great risk to the people living round with
the practical certainty that many of them will be
killed. The same will happen if harbours are
attacked which the Manifesto includes as
legitimate objects.

The Archbishop concluded his letter to Sampson
with a general consideration of the war and the
place of bombing in it, writing:
In my mind we have no business to be at war at
all unless by fighting we can, or believe we can,
serve the purpose of God. If believing that we
enter upon war it becomes a primary duty to
fight effectively. Indeed, this consideration then
takes precedence of nearly all others. The worst
of all things is to fight and do it ineffectively.
Therefore while I agree with you that the strategic
consideration cannot stand alone it becomes very
nearly decisive for our conduct. 41

Sampson wrote back two days later, expressing
his deep regret that the Archbishop would not
sponsor the Manifesto.
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Cosmo Lang, William Temple, Geoffrey
Fisher42 and Cyril Carbett were not dutiful
sycophants to a government that had appointed
them to the highest ecclesiastical offices in the
land. Even a cursory reading of their private
correspondence and papers will reveal four

deeply sensitive men who abhorred war: but also
men who recognised that a far greater crime
would be inflicted upon humanity if the war
against Nazi Germany was lost. Their views were
not shared by all members of the Anglican
Church, and as the bomber offensive intensified
during the last three years of the war so did the
disapprobation. George Bell, the Bishop of
Chichester, was perhaps the most persistent and
most celebrated critic. From 1940 onwards he
waged a highly public campaign against strategic
bombing in the national papers and in
Parliament. 43 Collins too continued with his own
protest, but his took a more surreptitious route
through the Fellowship of the Transfiguration of
Our Lord.
During 1943 and 1944 Collins invited
numerous individuals of high rank and public
acclaim to Yatesbury to speak to the members
of his Fellowship. Left-wing and "progressive"
speakers were preferred because they were more
likely to provide an alternative view to the war.
Above and Below Left: A British bomber releases a load of bombs
(including a 4,000 lb "cookie" and many smaller
incendiary bombs) over a cloud covered target in
Germany.
(CFPU PL 144267)

Below: The smashed city qf Cologne. the target qf'
over 22 attacks by RAF Bomber Command alone.
(CFPU PL 42538)
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Through the unconventional opmwns of his
chosen guests, Collins aimed to challenge the
membership. He hoped they would see the events
taking place around them in a different light to
that of the official sources they were more
commonly exposed. Collins particularly liked to
invite well-known Labour members of
Parliament who openly opposed the so-called
"yes" policy of most national politicians. Some
of the speakers included Sir Stafford Cripps,
Clement Attlee, Aneurin Bevan, Herbert
Morrison, C.S. Lewis, and the Soviet
Ambassador Ivan Maisky. Government
representatives from China, Poland, Belgium and
Czechoslovakia were also invited to speak to the
Fellowship, and even the King of Greece made
an "unofficial" visit to Yatesbury. 44
Collins strongly believed that every member
of society, according to individual opportunity
and ability, had an important part to play in
attempting to make Christian values apply in
national and international affairs. In fact, in his
view, committed Christians had an obligation to
get actively involved in public life and to press
government leaders for a policy more and more
in line with the teachings of the Gospel. Only in
this way, Collins maintained, could the world's
past and present failures be avoided in the future.
The celebrity lectures were an important part of
this awakening process for members of the
Fellowship, and they served to rally the faithful
to Collins' vision of a better world. They were
not part of any official or ordinary education
programme at Yatesbury, nor were they viewed
with equanimity by the camp commandant and
the Air Staff. Nonetheless the "Yatesbury lectures"
were allowed to proceed as organised, and all
were well attended with the numbers ranging
from the low eighties to just over two hundred. 45
In the summer of 1944, Collins was posted
from RAF Yatesbury to Bomber Command
Headquarters, High Wycombe. Bomber
Command was in need of a new chaplain and
Harris himself selected Collins to fill the vacancy.
Harris' choice was not as odd as it may first
appear. Collins married Diana Elliot, a cousin
of the AOC-in-C, in 1939, and was therefore a
member of Harris' extended family. 46 Collins was
sad to leave Yatesbury, 47 and the Fellowship that
he had created, but he quickly settled into his
new surroundings and immediately set to the
task of organising another Christian Fellowship

group and a celebrity lecture series. Invited
speakers included Sir Stafford Cripps, Herbert
Morrison, Ellen Wilkinson from the Ministry of
Home Security (Home Office), Anthony Eden and
Sir Richard Acland. Sir Stafford Cripps, the then
Minister of Aircraft Production and a Christian
moralist, gave the first lecture on 8 December,
taking as his theme "The Necessity for
Pacifism. "48
After a convivial dinner in the senior staff
mess, Cripps addressed a mixed group of slightly
less than 100 officers, NCOs and air crew, in the
largest assembly hall on the station, the Air Staff
Conference Room. He began by saying he would
try to answer a rather disturbing question- "Is
God My Co-Pilot?"- which had been put to him
by an operational pilot stationed in the north of
England. "Wherever you were God was looking
over your shoulder," Cripps told an increasingly
unsettled audience. Continuing on this theme at
some length, in a religious vein more applicable
to a church sermon than a sociable lecture, he
said that God was present at all times even when
an act of wickedness was being committed. A
pilot then could consider God as his co-pilot
"only if he was convinced that the job he was
doing was essential for the good of humanity."
Cripps then pointed at the officers in the
auditorium and said, "it was, therefore, very
important for those responsible to be sure that
no pilot is sent to undertake any bombing
operation which is not absolutely essential for
military purposes." The question period that
followed was acrimonious and slightly hostile,
but the evening concluded without incident. 49
Collins, for his part, had accomplished what he
had set out to do. He had spread a seed of doubt
- at Bomber Command Headquarters of all
places- that bombing was wrong and that each
and every participant had to reflect upon their
own individual responsibility for its continuation
against the test of Christian principles.
Not surprisingly, the lecture was not well
received by the staff officers, and even less so by
Sir Arthur Harris when he heard about it the
following morning. Harris did not attend the now
infamous lecture having sent Air Marshal
Saundby to receive their guest and chair the
meeting. In fact, Harris never had any use for
Sir Stafford Cripps; he only agreed to his coming
to give a lecture because he thought it was
impolitic to refuse. In its aftermath, Harris was
15
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aghast that the man who was personally in
charge of the Ministry overseeing the production
of heavy bombers. and who was straining every
sinew of British industry to increase output,
would publicly condemn Bomber Command's
methods and the Government policy that
directed them, both of which the very minister
in question was directly responsible for making.
In an effort to counter the argument presented
by Cripps - a sort of damage control exercise Harris called a compulsory meeting for officers
and all other ranks available, to which he invited
his Personal Assistant, Wing Commander T.D.
Weldon, 50 a tutor in Moral Philosophy at
Magdalen College Oxford, to speak on the subject
of born bing. 51
Weldon had been at High Wycombe since
1942. Upon his arrival he quickly became a great
admirer of Harris, and he was instrumental in
helping to establish a special guest room at
Springfield, Harris' official residence, where
papers and photographs outlining the workings
and achievements of Bomber Command were
displayed. Known as the "Conversion Chamber,"
its purpose was to demonstrate to disbelievers
that bombing really was destroying German
industrial areas. Using his intimate knowledge
of this material, Weldon was able to give an
exhaustive discourse on the bomber offensive
to a somewhat captive audience. 5 2
Weldon began his lecture by praising the
work carried out by Bomber Command. During
the long dark period following the British Army's
evacuation from Dunkirk, Bomber Command
and later the Anglo-American strategic bomber
forces, were alone in taking the offensive against
Nazi Germany. For three years, between June
1941 and June 1944, the bombing of Germany
was the only direct military assistance given by
the Western Allies to the Russians. Area bombing
attacks upon the vital centres of German war
production, Weldon pointed out, materially
reduced the enemy's war potential. They also
forced the Germans to employ in defence, repair
and rehabilitation measures, huge resources of
materiel and manpower which would otherwise
have been used in strengthening the offensive
power of their armed forces. By the progressive
destruction and dislocation of the German
military, industrial and economic systems, the
strategic bomber forces paved the way for the
Allied armies, re-entry into Europe, and later

supported their advance by undermining the
enemy's ability to present cohesive resistance.
Finally, with regard to the question of morality,
Weldon categorically denied that Bomber
Command had ever gone in for acts ofterrorism.
The air attacks on German cities, he concluded,
were strategically justified because they aimed
to shorten the war and thereby reduce to a
minimum the loss of human life. 5 3
Harris was satisfied with Weldon's effort.
Nevertheless, neither Collins nor Weldon could
take much credit for changing the individual
opinions held on bombing by the officers and
men at Bomber Command Headquarters, The
unintended and indirect confrontation between
Collins and Weldon over the ethics of bombing,
or as Collins called it "the Bombing of Ethics,"
did, however, ask and attempt to answer three
seminal questions in this controversy: Was the
bomber offensive immoral and a crime against
humanity? Was it a legitimate act of war? Was it
effective? Worlds of perception separated the
protagonists then as now. Today, some 50 years
on, little has changed in this distinctly polarised
debate.
While acknowledging that there are plenty
of valid criticisms that can be levelled at the way
the Anglo-American bomber campaign was
conducted, it is equally clear that bombing
steadily eroded Germany's capacity to make war.
Albert Speer, perhaps Hitler's favourite confidant
and his Minister of Armaments and Munitions,
is but one of many former enemies who called
the bomber offensive "the greatest lost battle on
the German side. "54 The diaries of Dr. Joseph
Goebbels, Minister of Propaganda, contain
numerous references to the devastating effect
Allied bombing had on the German economy,
people and armed forces. 55 Similar testimonials
are to be found in the biographies, diaries and
memoirs of a host of German commanders,
including Kesselring, Rommel, von Rundstedt,
von Manteuffel and von Mallenthin, to name but
a few of the more prominent ones. 56 Britain's
official historians reached the same general
conclusion that strategic bombing made "a
contribution to victory which was decisive. "57
More recent scholarly research confirms the
immediate post-war analysis. Richard Overy, a
distinguished historian at King's College,
London, examined Germany's war economy in
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detail and concluded that "bombing had obvious
effects in reducing worker morale and destroying
facilities. "58 His research demonstrates that
bombing placed a ceiling on German war
production and - despite an increase in
production in 1943 and 1944 - reduced the
output of tanks by 35 per cent and aircraft by
31 per cent. 59 Professor Sir Michael Howard, who
fought in the Second World War and who has
studied, lectured and published on the subject
for more than half a century, is perhaps the most
eminent historian to speak out in support ofthe
strategic air offensives results. He recently told
a distinguished audience of historians at the RAF
Club, Piccadilly, that the strategic air offensive
in Europe, "made an absolutely essential
contribution to the victory that was achieved by
the armed forces of the Allies fighting in three
elements. "60 Present and future critics would do
well to bear in mind a further admonition from
the official historians, who, some 30 years ago
wrote, "those who claim that the Bomber
Command contribution to the war was less than
this are factually in error. "61
What then is the importance of the debate
between Collins and Weldon? Through a
combination of unconnected circumstances both
men ended up at Bomber Command
Headquarters where they were forced to search
the very depths of their inner-most beliefs in an
attempt to reconcile unreconcilable questions.
Their struggle demonstrates the range of inquiry
that is possible in a democratic society, even
during the stresses of war. Their differing
perspectives also add much to our
understanding of both the bomber offensive and
the deep and often tortuous emotions it conjured
up, both during the war, and in its aftermath. In
short. they inject a useful and much needed
degree of balance back into a debate which
recently has succumbed to a series of woefully
superficial studies plagued as too many ofthem
are by emotive hyperbole weakly disguised as
empirical fact. Debate and disagreement are
possible without distorting either the facts or
the truth. If journalists and others are going to
deal with history they have a responsibility to
their audiences to delve more deeply into their
topic and not sacrifice the complexities in a facile
overview. It is for this reason that in the wider
history of strategic bombing the small part
played by a conscientious cleric and a secular
scholar merit our attention and our study.
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